• Acemoglu, D. et al., 2011. The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution. American Economic Review, 101(7), pp.3286–3307.
    • Abstract

      The French Revolution had a momentous impact on neighboring countries. It removed the legal and economic barriers protecting oligarchies, established the principle of equality before the law, and prepared economies for the new industrial opportunities of the second half of the 19th century. We present within-Germany evidence on the long-run implications of these institutional reforms. Occupied areas appear to have experienced more rapid urbanization growth, especially after 1850. A two-stage least squares strategy provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the reforms instigated by the French had a positive impact on growth.

    • BibTeX
      @article{Acemoglu:2011fk,
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Cantoni, Davide and Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 17:06:30 +0000},
        date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:30:34 +0000},
        journal = {American Economic Review},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = dec,
        number = {7},
        pages = {3286-3307},
        title = {The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution},
        volume = {101},
        year = {2011}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D. & Johnson, S., 2005. Unbundling Institutions. Journal of Political Economy, 113(5), pp.949–995.
    • Abstract

      This paper evaluates the importance of “property rights institutions,” which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and “contracting institutions,” which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history and document strong first-stage relationships between property rights institutions and the determinants of European colonization strategy (settler mortality and population density before colonization) and between contracting institutions and the identity of the colonizing power. Using this instrumental variable approach, we find that property rights institutions have a first-order effect on long-run economic growth, investment, and financial development. Contracting institutions appear to matter only for the form of financial intermediation. A possible explanation for this pattern is that individuals often find ways of altering the terms of their formal and informal contracts to avoid the adverse effects of weak contracting institutions but find it harder to mitigate the risk of expropriation in this way.

    • BibTeX
      @article{AJ2005,
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Johnson, Simon},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 16:52:28 +0000},
        date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:30:48 +0000},
        journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
        keywords = {inst},
        number = {5},
        pages = {949-995},
        title = {Unbundling Institutions},
        volume = {113},
        year = {2005}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J., 2005. The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth. The American Economic Review, 95(3), pp.pp. 546–579. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      The rise of Western Europe after 1500 is due largely to growth in countries with access to the Atlantic Ocean and with substantial trade with the New World, Africa, and Asia via the Atlantic. This trade and the associated colonialism affected Europe not only directly, but also indirectly by inducing institutional change. Where "initial" political institutions (those established before 1500) placed significant checks on the monarchy, the growth of Atlantic trade strengthened merchant groups by constraining the power of the monarchy, and helped merchants obtain changes in institutions to protect property rights. These changes were central to subsequent economic growth.

    • BibTeX
      @article{AJR2005,
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James},
        copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2005 American Economic Association},
        date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:30:42 +0000},
        issn = {00028282},
        journal = {The American Economic Review},
        jstor_articletype = {research-article},
        jstor_formatteddate = {Jun., 2005},
        keywords = {inst},
        number = {3},
        pages = {pp. 546-579},
        publisher = {American Economic Association},
        title = {The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth},
        url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132729},
        volume = {95},
        year = {2005},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132729}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J., 2002. Reversal of fortune: geography and development in the making of the modern world income distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(4), pp.1231–1294.
    • Abstract

      Among countries colonized by European powers during the past 500 years, those that were relatively rich in 1500 are now relatively poor. We document this reversal using data on urbanization patterns and population density, which, we argue, proxy for economic prosperity. This reversal weighs against a view that links economic development to geographic factors. Instead, we argue that the reversal reflects changes in the institutions resulting from European colonialism. The European intervention appears to have created an "institutional reversal" among these societies, meaning that Europeans were more likely to introduce institutions encouraging investment in regions that were previously poor. This institutional reversal accounts for the reversal in relative incomes. We provide further support for this view by documenting that the reversal in relative incomes took place during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and resulted from societies with good institutions taking advantage of the opportunity to industrialize.

    • BibTeX
      @article{acemoglu2002reversal,
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James},
        date-added = {2011-05-24 20:00:47 -0500},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:55:07 +0000},
        journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
        keywords = {inst,divergence},
        number = {4},
        pages = {1231--1294},
        title = {Reversal of fortune: geography and development in the making of the modern world income distribution},
        volume = {117},
        year = {2002}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. & Robinson, J., 2001. The colonial origins of economic development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5), pp.1369–1401.
    • Abstract

      We exploit differences in European mortality rates to estimate the effect of institutions on economic performance. Europeans adopted very different colonization policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up extractive institutions. These institutions persisted to the present. Exploiting differences in European mortality rates as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita. Once the effect of institutions is controlled for, countries in Africa or those closer to the equator do not have lower incomes.

    • BibTeX
      @article{acemoglu2001colonial,
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Johnson, Simon and Robinson, James},
        date-added = {2011-05-24 20:00:06 -0500},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:55:02 +0000},
        journal = {American Economic Review},
        keywords = {inst,divergence},
        number = {5},
        pages = {1369--1401},
        title = {The colonial origins of economic development: an empirical investigation},
        volume = {91},
        year = {2001}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J., 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, New York, NY: Crown Publishers.
    • BibTeX
      @book{Acemoglu:2012uq,
        address = {New York, NY},
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James},
        date-added = {2012-04-13 16:47:59 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:04:52 +0000},
        keywords = {intro,inst},
        publisher = {Crown Publishers},
        title = {Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty},
        year = {2012}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J., 2005. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    • BibTeX
      @book{Acemoglu:2005fk,
        address = {Cambridge, UK},
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James},
        date-added = {2012-04-13 16:46:15 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:04:37 +0000},
        keywords = {intro,inst},
        publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
        title = {Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy},
        year = {2005}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A., 2000. Political losers as a barrier to economic development. The American Economic Review, 90(2), pp.126–130.
    • BibTeX
      @article{acemoglu2000political,
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A.},
        date-added = {2011-05-24 19:59:16 -0500},
        date-modified = {2013-04-21 15:00:13 +0000},
        journal = {The American Economic Review},
        keywords = {inst},
        number = {2},
        pages = {126--130},
        publisher = {JSTOR},
        title = {Political losers as a barrier to economic development},
        volume = {90},
        year = {2000}
      }
      
  • Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J.A., 2000. Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), pp.1167–1199.
    • Abstract

      During the nineteenth century most Western societies extended voting rights, a decision that led to unprecedented redistributive programs. We argue that these political reforms can be viewed as strategic decisions by the political elite to prevent widespread social unrest and revolution. Political transition, rather than redistribution under existing political institutions, occurs because current transfers do not ensure future transfers, while the extension of the franchise changes future political equilibria and acts as a commitment to redistribution. Our theory also offers a novel explanation for the Kuznets curve in many Western economies during this period, with the fall in inequality following redistribution due to democratization.

    • BibTeX
      @article{acemoglu2000did,
        author = {Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A.},
        date-added = {2011-05-24 19:58:35 -0500},
        date-modified = {2013-04-21 15:00:13 +0000},
        journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
        keywords = {inst},
        number = {4},
        pages = {1167--1199},
        publisher = {MIT Press},
        title = {Why did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective},
        volume = {115},
        year = {2000}
      }
      
  • Albouy, D., 2012. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment. American Economic Review, 102(6), pp.3059–3076.
    • Abstract

      In a seminal contribution, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) evaluate the effect of property rights institutions on national income using estimated mortality rates of early European settlers as an instrument for the risk of capital expropriation. Returning to their original sources, I find the settler mortality data suffer from a number of inconsistencies, comparability problems, and questionable geographic assignments. When various methods are used to deal with these issues, the first-stage relationship between mortality and expropriation risk is no longer robust and typically insignificant. Consequently instrumental variable estimates are unreliable and suffer from weak instrument pathologies.

    • BibTeX
      @article{Albouy:2012fk,
        author = {Albouy, David},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 19:19:03 +0000},
        date-modified = {2013-04-21 15:00:13 +0000},
        journal = {American Economic Review},
        keywords = {ec7350,inst},
        number = {6},
        pages = {3059-3076},
        title = {The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment},
        volume = {102},
        year = {2012}
      }
      
  • Algan, Y. & Cahuc, P., 2010. Inherited Trust and Growth. American Economic Review, 100(5), pp.2060–92. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      This paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation. We show that inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants is significantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears. We thus use the inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants as a time-varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin. This strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects. (JEL N11, N12, N31, N32, O47, Z13)

    • BibTeX
      @article{ac2010,
        author = {Algan, Yann and Cahuc, Pierre},
        date-added = {2015-05-27 16:49:59 +0000},
        date-modified = {2016-03-06 16:41:21 +0000},
        journal = {American Economic Review},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = dec,
        number = {5},
        pages = {2060-92},
        title = {{Inherited Trust and Growth}},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v100y2010i5p2060-92.html},
        volume = {100},
        year = {2010},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v100y2010i5p2060-92.html}
      }
      
  • Auer, R., 2012. Geography, Institutions, and the Making of Comparative Development.
    • Abstract

      While the direct impact of geographic endowments on prosperity is present in all countries, in former colonies, geography has also affected colonization policies and, therefore, institutional outcomes. Using non-colonized countries as a control group, I re-examine the theories put forward by La Porta et al. (1999) and by Acemoglu et al. (2001), finding strong support for both theories, but also evidence that the authors’ estimates are mildly biased since they confound the effect of the historical determinants of institutions with the sizeable direct impact of geographic endowments on development.

    • BibTeX
      @unpublished{Auer:2012uq,
        author = {Auer, Raphael},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 19:21:20 +0000},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:55:32 +0000},
        keywords = {ec7350,inst},
        month = jul,
        note = {CESifo Working Paper 3874},
        title = {Geography, Institutions, and the Making of Comparative Development},
        year = {2012}
      }
      
  • Banerjee, A. & Iyer, L., 2005. History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. The American Economic Review, 95(4), pp.pp. 1190–1213. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      We analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. These areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education. These differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems; they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices.

    • BibTeX
      @article{bi2005,
        author = {Banerjee, Abhijit and Iyer, Lakshmi},
        copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2005 American Economic Association},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:55:37 +0000},
        issn = {00028282},
        journal = {The American Economic Review},
        jstor_articletype = {research-article},
        jstor_formatteddate = {Sep., 2005},
        keywords = {ec7350,inst},
        number = {4},
        pages = {pp. 1190-1213},
        publisher = {American Economic Association},
        title = {History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India},
        url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132711},
        volume = {95},
        year = {2005},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132711}
      }
      
  • Banerjee, A.V. & Duflo, E., 2003. Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say? Journal of Economic Growth, 8(3), pp.267–299. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      This paper describes the correlations between inequality and the growth rates in cross-country data. Using non-parametric methods, we show that the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net changes in inequality: changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the next period. The estimated relationship is robust to variations in control variables and estimation methods. This inverted U-curve is consistent with a simple political economy model but it could also reflect the nature of measurement errors, and, in general, efforts to interpret this evidence causally run into difficult identification problems. We show that this non-linearity is sufficient to explain why previous estimates of the relationship between the level of inequality and growth are so different from one another.

    • BibTeX
      @article{bd2003,
        author = {Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Duflo, Esther},
        date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:31:05 +0000},
        issn = {1381-4338},
        issue = {3},
        journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
        keyword = {Business and Economics},
        keywords = {inst},
        pages = {267-299},
        publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
        title = {Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?},
        url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026205114860},
        volume = {8},
        year = {2003},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026205114860}
      }
      
  • Besley, T., Persson, T. & Sturm, D.M., 2010. Political Competition, Policy, and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States.
    • Abstract

      This paper develops a simple model to analyze how a lack of politi- cal competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we Önd robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending and a reduced likelihood of using right-to-work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth.

    • BibTeX
      @unpublished{besley_etal_2010,
        author = {Besley, Timothy and Persson, Torsten and Sturm, Daniel M.},
        date-added = {2011-05-15 19:39:15 -0500},
        date-modified = {2013-04-21 15:00:13 +0000},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = jan,
        note = {Working paper},
        title = {Political Competition, Policy, and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the United States},
        year = {2010},
        bdsk-file-1 = {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}
      }
      
  • Bloom, N., Sadun, R. & Reenen, J. van, 2012. The Organization of Firms Across Countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4), pp.1663–1705.
    • Abstract

      We argue that social capital as proxied by trust increases aggregate productivity by affecting the organization of firms. To do this we collect new data on the decentralization of investment, hiring, production, and sales decisions from corporate headquarters to local plant managers in almost 4,000 firms in the United States, Europe, and Asia. We find that firms headquartered in high-trust regions are significantly more likely to decentralize. To help identify causal effects, we look within multinational firms and show that higher levels of bilateral trust between the multinational’s country of origin and subsidiary’s country of location increases decentralization, even after instrumenting trust using religious similarities between the countries. Finally, we show evidence suggesting that trust raises aggregate productivity by facilitating reallocation between firms and allowing more efficient firms to grow, as CEOs can decentralize more decisions.

    • BibTeX
      @article{Bloom:2012dq,
        author = {Bloom, Nicholas and Sadun, Raffaella and van Reenen, John},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 19:37:48 +0000},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:56:11 +0000},
        journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
        keywords = {ec7350,inst},
        number = {4},
        pages = {1663-1705},
        title = {The Organization of Firms Across Countries},
        volume = {127},
        year = {2012}
      }
      
  • Bruhn, M. & Gallego, F.A., 2012. Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do they matter for Economic Development? Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2), pp.433–461.
    • Abstract

      Levels of development vary widely within countries in the Amer- icas. We argue that part of this variation has its roots in the colonial era, when colonizers engaged in different economic activities in different regions of a country. We present evidence consistent with the view that “bad” activities (those that depended heavily on labor exploitation) led to lower economic development today than “good” activities (those that did not rely on labor exploitation). Our results also suggest that differences in political repre- sentation (but not in income inequality or human capital) could be the intermediating factor between colonial activities and current development.

    • BibTeX
      @article{Bruhn:2012zr,
        author = {Bruhn, Miriam and Gallego, Francisco A.},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 19:27:48 +0000},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:56:36 +0000},
        journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics},
        keywords = {ec7350,inst},
        month = may,
        number = {2},
        pages = {433-461},
        title = {Good, Bad, and Ugly Colonial Activities: Do they matter for Economic Development?},
        volume = {94},
        year = {2012}
      }
      
  • Cantoni, D., 2010. The economic effects of the Protestant Reformation: Testing the Weber hypothesis in the German Lands, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      Many theories, most famously Max Weber’s essay on the “Protestant ethic,” have hypothesized that Protestantism should have favored economic development. With their considerable religious heterogeneity and stability of denominational affiliations until the 19th century, the German Lands of the Holy Roman Empire present an ideal testing ground for this hypothesis. Using population figures in a dataset comprising 272 cities in the years 1300–1900, I find no effects of Protestantism on economic growth. The finding is robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, and does not appear to depend on data selection or small sample size. In addition, Protestantism has no effect when interacted with other likely determinants of economic development. I also analyze the endogeneity of religious choice; instrumental variables estimates of the effects of Protestantism are similar to the OLS results.

    • BibTeX
      @techreport{cantoni2010,
        author = {Cantoni, Davide},
        date-added = {2015-05-27 16:58:37 +0000},
        date-modified = {2016-03-06 16:41:25 +0000},
        institution = {Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = dec,
        number = {1260},
        title = {{The economic effects of the Protestant Reformation: Testing the Weber hypothesis in the German Lands}},
        type = {Economics Working Papers},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/upf/upfgen/1260.html},
        year = {2010},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/upf/upfgen/1260.html}
      }
      
  • Cantoni, D. & Yuchtman, N., 2012. Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      We present new data documenting medieval Europe’s "Commercial Revolution” using information on the establishment of markets in Germany. We use these data to test whether medieval universities played a causal role in expanding economic activity, examining the foundation of Germany’s first universities after 1386 following the Papal Schism. We find that the trend rate of market establishment breaks upward in 1386 and that this break is greatest where the distance to a university shrank most. There is no differential pre-1386 trend associated with the reduction in distance to a university, and there is no break in trend in 1386 where university proximity did not change. These results are not affected by excluding cities close to universities or cities belonging to territories that included universities. Universities provided training in newly-rediscovered Roman and Canon law; students with legal training served in positions that reduced the uncertainty of trade in medieval Europe. We argue that training in the law, and the consequent development of legal and administrative institutions, was an important channel linking universities and greater economic activity.

    • BibTeX
      @techreport{cy2012,
        author = {Cantoni, Davide and Yuchtman, Noam},
        date-added = {2015-05-27 16:43:46 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-05-27 16:43:58 +0000},
        institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = apr,
        number = {17979},
        title = {{Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution}},
        type = {NBER Working Papers},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/17979.html},
        year = {2012},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/17979.html}
      }
      
  • Chanda, A., Cook, C.J. & Putterman, L., 2014. Persistence of Fortune: Accounting for Population Movements, There Was No Post-Columbian Reversal. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6(3), pp.1–28. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      Using data on place of origin of today’s country populations and the indicators of level of development in 1500 used by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002), we confirm a reversal of fortune for colonized countries as territories, but find persistence of fortune for people and their descendants. Persistence results are at least as strong for three alternative measures of early development, for which reversal for territories, however, fails to hold. Additional exercises lend support to Glaeser et al.’s (2004) view that human capital is a more fundamental channel of influence of precolonial conditions on modern development than is quality of institutions.

    • BibTeX
      @article{ccp14,
        author = {Chanda, Areendam and Cook, C. Justin and Putterman, Louis},
        date-added = {2015-03-16 20:42:39 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-03-16 20:42:54 +0000},
        journal = {American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = jul,
        number = {3},
        pages = {1-28},
        title = {{Persistence of Fortune: Accounting for Population Movements, There Was No Post-Columbian Reversal}},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmac/v6y2014i3p1-28.html},
        volume = {6},
        year = {2014},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejmac/v6y2014i3p1-28.html}
      }
      
  • De Long, J.B. & Shleifer, A., 1993. Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution. Journal of Law and Economics, 36(2), pp.671–702. Available at: Link.
    • BibTeX
      @article{dls93,
        author = {De Long, J Bradford and Shleifer, Andrei},
        date-added = {2015-03-16 21:12:56 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-03-16 21:36:56 +0000},
        journal = {Journal of Law and Economics},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = oct,
        number = {2},
        pages = {671-702},
        title = {Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v36y1993i2p671-702.html},
        volume = {36},
        year = {1993},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v36y1993i2p671-702.html}
      }
      
  • Croix, D. De la & Doepke, M., 2009. To segregate or to integrate: Education politics and democracy. Review of Economic Studies, 76(2), pp.597–628.
    • Abstract

      How is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich? Theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system. We develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures. We find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad-based democracy where politicians are responsive to low-income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich. The main predictions of the theory are consistent with state-level data and micro data from the U.S. as well as cross-country evidence from the Programme for International Student Assessment study.

    • BibTeX
      @article{de2009segregate,
        author = {De la Croix, David and Doepke, Matthias},
        date-added = {2011-05-24 19:45:37 -0500},
        date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:15:32 +0000},
        journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
        keywords = {inst},
        number = {2},
        pages = {597--628},
        publisher = {Wiley Online Library},
        title = {To segregate or to integrate: Education politics and democracy},
        volume = {76},
        year = {2009}
      }
      
  • Dell, M., 2010. The Persistent Effect of Peru’s Mining Mita. Econometrica, 78(6), pp.1863–1903.
    • Abstract

      This study utilizes regression discontinuity to examine the long-run impacts of the mita, an extensive forced mining labor system in effect in Peru and Bolivia between 1573 and 1812. Results indicate that a mita effect lowers household consumption by around 25% and increases the prevalence of stunted growth in children by around six percentage points in subjected districts today. Using data from the Spanish Empire and Peruvian Republic to trace channels of institutional persistence, I show that the mita’s influence has persisted through its impacts on land tenure and public goods provision. Mita districts historically had fewer large landowners and lower educational attainment. Today, they are less integrated into road networks, and their residents are substantially more likely to be subsistence farmers.

    • BibTeX
      @article{Dell:2010vn,
        author = {Dell, Melissa},
        date-added = {2012-04-13 16:43:16 +0000},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:57:19 +0000},
        journal = {Econometrica},
        keywords = {intro,ec7350,inst},
        number = {6},
        pages = {1863-1903},
        title = {The Persistent Effect of Peru's Mining Mita},
        volume = {78},
        year = {2010}
      }
      
  • Di Liberto, A. & Sideri, M., 2015. Past Dominations, Current Institutions and the Italian Regional Economic Performance, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      We study the connection between economic performance and the quality of government institutions for the sample of 103 Italian NUTS3 regions, including new measures of institutional performance calculated using data on the provision of different areas of public services. In order to address likely endogeneity problems, we use the histories of the different foreign dominations that ruled Italian regions between the 16th and 17th century and over seven hundred years before the creation of the unified Italian State. Our results suggest that past historical institutions play a significant role on the current public administration quality and show that the latter makes a difference to the economic performance of regions. Overall, our analysis confirms that the quality of institutions matters for development, and that history can be used to find suitable instruments.

    • BibTeX
      @techreport{disideri2015,
        author = {Di Liberto, Adriana and Sideri, Marco},
        date-added = {2015-03-16 20:18:07 +0000},
        date-modified = {2017-02-01 15:50:31 +0000},
        institution = {Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = jan,
        number = {8776},
        title = {{Past Dominations, Current Institutions and the Italian Regional Economic Performance}},
        type = {IZA Discussion Papers},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8776.html},
        year = {2015},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8776.html}
      }
      
  • Dippel, C., Greif, A. & Trefler, D., 2015. The Rents From Trade and Coercive Institutions: Removing the Sugar Coating, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      The 19th century collapse of world sugar prices should have depressed wages in the British West Indies sugar colonies. It did not. We explain this by showing how lower prices weakened the power of the white planter elite and thus led to an easing of the coercive institutions that depressed wages e.g., institutions that kept land out of the hands of peasants. Using unique data for 14 British West Indies sugar colonies from 1838 to 1913, we examine the impact of the collapse of sugar prices on wages and incarceration rates. We find that in colonies that were poorly suited for sugar cane cultivation (an exogenous colony characteristic), the planter elite declined in power and the institutions they created and supported became less coercive. As a result, wages rose by 20% and incarceration rates per capita were cut in half. In contrast, in colonies that were highly suited for sugar cane there was little change in the power of the planter elite — as a result, institutions did not change, the market-based mechanisms of standard trade theory were salient, and wages fell by 24%. In short, movements in the terms of trade induced changes in coercive institutions, changes that are central for understanding how the terms of trade affects wages.

    • BibTeX
      @techreport{dgt15,
        author = {Dippel, Christian and Greif, Avner and Trefler, Daniel},
        date-added = {2015-03-16 20:23:19 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-03-16 20:23:33 +0000},
        institution = {National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = feb,
        number = {20958},
        title = {{The Rents From Trade and Coercive Institutions: Removing the Sugar Coating}},
        type = {NBER Working Papers},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/20958.html},
        year = {2015},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/20958.html}
      }
      
  • Easterly, W., 2007. Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights from a New Instrument. Journal of Development Economics, 84(2), pp.755–776.
    • Abstract

      Consistent with the provocative hypothesis of Engerman and Sokoloff [Engermann, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff (1997), “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth Among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in Stephen Haber, ed. How Latin America Fell Behind, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press., Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Stanley L. Engerman (2000), Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World, Journal of Economic Perspectives v14, n3, 217–32.], this paper confirms with cross-country data that agricultural endowments predict inequality and inequality predicts development. The use of agricultural endowments –specifically the abundance of land suitable for growing wheat relative to that suitable for growing sugarcane – as an instrument for inequality is this paper’s approach to problems of measurement and endogeneity of inequality. The paper finds inequality also affects other development outcomes – institutions and schooling –which the literature has emphasized as mechanisms by which higher inequality lowers per capita income. It tests the inequality hypothesis for development, institutional quality and schooling against other recent hypotheses in the literature. While finding some evidence consistent with other development fundamentals, the paper finds high inequality to independently be a large and statistically significant barrier to prosperity, good quality institutions, and high schooling.

    • BibTeX
      @article{Easterly:2007fu,
        author = {Easterly, William},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 20:19:26 +0000},
        date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:31:15 +0000},
        journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = nov,
        number = {2},
        pages = {755-776},
        title = {Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights from a New Instrument},
        volume = {84},
        year = {2007}
      }
      
  • Easterly, W. & Levine, R., 2012. The European Origins of Economic Development.
    • Abstract

      A large literature suggests that European settlement outside of Europe shaped institutional, educational, technological, cultural, and economic outcomes. This literature has had a serious gap: no direct measure of colonial European settlement. In this paper, we (1) construct a new database on the European share of the population during the early stages of colonization and (2) examine its impact on the level of economic development today. We find a remarkably strong impact of colonial European settlement on development. According to one illustrative exercise, 47 percent of average global development levels today are attributable to Europeans. One of our most surprising findings is the positive effect of even a small minority European population during the colonial period on per capita income today, contradicting traditional and recent views. There is some evidence for an institutional channel, but our findings are most consistent with human capital playing a central role in the way that colonial European settlement affects development today.

    • BibTeX
      @unpublished{Easterly:2012qf,
        author = {Easterly, William and Levine, Ross},
        date-added = {2012-12-19 19:34:28 +0000},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:50:19 +0000},
        keywords = {inst,divergence,ec7340},
        month = jun,
        note = {NBER Working Paper 18162},
        title = {The European Origins of Economic Development},
        year = {2012}
      }
      
  • Easterly, W. & Levine, R., 2003. Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(1), pp.3–39.
    • Abstract

      Does economic development depend on geographic endowments like temperate instead of tropical location, the ecological conditions shaping diseases, or an environment good for grains or certain cash crops? Or do these endowments of tropics, germs, and crops affect economic development only through institutions or policies? We test the endowment, institution, and policy views against each other using cross country evidence. We find evidence that tropics, germs, and crops affect development through institutions. We find no evidence that tropics, germs, and crops affect country incomes directly other than through institutions, nor do we find any effect of policies on development once we control for institutions.

    • BibTeX
      @article{Easterly:2003kx,
        annote = {Easterly is cool},
        author = {Easterly, William and Levine, Ross},
        date-added = {2012-04-13 16:41:45 +0000},
        date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:57:34 +0000},
        journal = {Journal of Monetary Economics},
        keywords = {intro,inst,biogeography},
        month = jan,
        number = {1},
        pages = {3-39},
        title = {Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic Development},
        volume = {50},
        year = {2003}
      }
      
  • Fenske, J., 2014. Ecology, Trade, And States In Pre-Colonial Africa. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(3), pp.612–640. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      State capacity matters for growth. I test Bates’ explanation of pre-colonial African states. He argues that trade across ecological boundaries promoted states. I find that African societies in ecologically diverse environments had more centralized states. This is robust to reverse causation, omitted heterogeneity, and alternative interpretations of the link between diversity and states. The result survives including non-African societies. I test mechanisms connecting trade to states, and find that trade supported class stratification between rulers and ruled. I underscore the importance of ethnic institutions and inform our knowledge of the effects of trade on institutions.

    • BibTeX
      @article{fenske2014,
        author = {Fenske, James},
        date-added = {2015-05-12 00:49:57 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-05-12 00:50:25 +0000},
        journal = {Journal of the European Economic Association},
        keywords = {biogeography,inst},
        month = jun,
        number = {3},
        pages = {612-640},
        title = {{Ecology, Trade, And States In Pre-Colonial Africa}},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jeurec/v12y2014i3p612-640.html},
        volume = {12},
        year = {2014},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jeurec/v12y2014i3p612-640.html}
      }
      
  • Fenske, J., 2013. Does Land Abundance Explain African Institutions? Economic Journal, 123(12), pp.1363–1390. Available at: Link.
    • Abstract

      I show how abundant land and scarce labor shaped African institutions before colonial rule. I present a model in which exogenous suitability of the land for agriculture and endogenously evolving population determine the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny. I then use cross-sectional data on pre-colonial African societies to demonstrate that, consistent with the model, the existence of land rights, slavery, and polygyny occurred in those parts of Africa that were the most suitable for agriculture, and in which population density was greatest. Next, I use the model to explain institutions among the Egba of southwestern Nigeria from 1830 to 1914. While many Egba institutions were typical of a land-abundant environment, they sold land and had disputes over it. These exceptions were the result of a period of land scarcity when the Egba first arrived at Abeokuta and of heterogeneity in the quality of land.

      (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

    • BibTeX
      @article{fenske2013,
        author = {Fenske, James},
        date-added = {2015-05-26 17:59:53 +0000},
        date-modified = {2015-05-26 18:00:10 +0000},
        journal = {Economic Journal},
        keywords = {inst},
        month = dec,
        number = {12},
        pages = {1363-1390},
        title = {{Does Land Abundance Explain African Institutions?}},
        url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v123y2013i12p1363-1390.html},
        volume = {123},
        year = {2013},
        bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecj/econjl/v123y2013i12p1363-1390.html}
      }
      
    • Feyrer, J. & Sacerdote, B., 2009. Colonialism and Modern Income: Islands as Natural Experiments. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2), pp.pp. 245–262. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        Using a new database of islands throughout the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans we find a robust positive relationship between the number of years spent as a European colony and current GDP per capita. We argue that the nature of discovery and colonization of islands provides random variation in the length and type of colonial experience. We instrument for length of colonization using variation in prevailing wind patterns. We argue that wind speed and direction had a significant effect on historical colonial rule but do not have a direct effect on GDP today. The data also suggest that years as a colony after 1700 are more beneficial than earlier years. We also find a discernable pecking order among the colonial powers, with years under U.S., British, French, and Dutch rule having more beneficial effects than Spanish or Portuguese rule. Our finding of a strong connection between modern income and years of colonization is conditional on being colonized at all since each of the islands in our data set spent some time under colonial rule.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Feyrer2009,
          author = {Feyrer, James and Sacerdote, Bruce},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2009 The MIT Press},
          date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:57:51 +0000},
          issn = {00346535},
          journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {May 2009},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          number = {2},
          pages = {pp. 245-262},
          publisher = {The MIT Press},
          title = {Colonialism and Modern Income: Islands as Natural Experiments},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25651336},
          volume = {91},
          year = {2009},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25651336}
        }
        
    • Galor, O. & Moav, O., 2006. Das human-kapital: A theory of the demise of the class structure. The Review of Economic Studies, 73(1), p.85.
      • Abstract

        This paper hypothesizes that the demise of the 19th century’s European class structure reflects a deliberate transformation of society orchestrated by the capitalists. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it argues that the demise of this class structure was an outcome of a cooperative, rather than divisive process. The research suggests that the transition from this class structure may be viewed as the outcome of an optimal reaction by the capitalists to the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their profit rates. The paper argues that the process of capital accumulation gradually intensified the importance of skilled labor in the production process and generated an incentive for investment in human capital. Due to the complementarity between physical and human capital in production, the capitalists were among the prime beneficiaries of the accumulation of human capital by the masses. They therefore had the incentive to support public education that would sustain their profit rates and would improve their economic well-being, although it would ultimately undermine their dynasty’s position in the social ladder. The research suggests that Karl Marx’s highly influential prediction about the inevitable class struggle due to declining profit rates stemmed from an under appreciation of the role that human capital would play in the production process. The basic premise of this research, regarding the positive attitude of capitalists towards education reforms, is supported empirically by a newly constructed data set of the voting patterns on England’s education reform proposed in the Balfour Act of 1902.

      • BibTeX
        @article{galor2006human,
          author = {Galor, Oded and Moav, Omer},
          date-added = {2011-05-24 19:43:07 -0500},
          date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:16:04 +0000},
          journal = {The Review of Economic Studies},
          keywords = {inst,divergence},
          number = {1},
          pages = {85},
          publisher = {Oxford University Press},
          title = {Das human-kapital: A theory of the demise of the class structure},
          volume = {73},
          year = {2006}
        }
        
    • Glaeser, E.L. et al., 2004. Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), pp.271–303. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.

      • BibTeX
        @article{glls2004,
          author = {Glaeser, Edward L. and La Porta, Rafael and Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:31:41 +0000},
          issn = {1381-4338},
          issue = {3},
          journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
          keyword = {Business and Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          pages = {271-303},
          publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
          title = {Do Institutions Cause Growth?},
          url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038933.16398.ed},
          volume = {9},
          year = {2004},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:JOEG.0000038933.16398.ed}
        }
        
    • Goldstein, M. & Udry, C., 2008. The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana. Journal of Political Economy, 116(6), pp.981–1022. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        We examine the impact of ambiguous and contested land rights on investment and productivity in agriculture in Akwapim, Ghana. We show that individuals who hold powerful positions in a local political hierarchy have more secure tenure rights and that as a consequence they invest more in land fertility and have substantially higher output. The intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given individual corresponds to that individual’s security of tenure over those specific plots and, in turn, to the individual’s position in the political hierarchy relevant to those specific plots. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

      • BibTeX
        @article{gu2008,
          author = {Goldstein, Markus and Udry, Christopher},
          date-added = {2015-05-27 16:47:40 +0000},
          date-modified = {2015-05-27 16:47:49 +0000},
          journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = dec,
          number = {6},
          pages = {981-1022},
          title = {{The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana}},
          url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v116y2008i6p981-1022.html},
          volume = {116},
          year = {2008},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v116y2008i6p981-1022.html}
        }
        
    • Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. & Zingales, L., 2009. Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), pp.pp. 1095–1131. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        How much do cultural biases affect economic exchange? We answer this question by using data on bilateral trust between European countries. We document that this trust is affected not only by the characteristics of the country being trusted, but also by cultural aspects of the match between trusting country and trusted country, such as their history of conflicts and their religious, genetic, and somatic similarities. We then find that lower bilateral trust leads to less trade between two countries, less portfolio investment, and less direct investment, even after controlling for the characteristics of the two countries. This effect is stronger for goods that are more trust intensive. Our results suggest that perceptions rooted in culture are important (and generally omitted) determinants of economic exchange.

      • BibTeX
        @article{gsz2009,
          author = {Guiso, Luigi and Sapienza, Paola and Zingales, Luigi},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2009 Oxford University Press},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:31:50 +0000},
          issn = {00335533},
          journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {Aug., 2009},
          keywords = {inst},
          number = {3},
          pages = {pp. 1095-1131},
          publisher = {Oxford University Press},
          title = {Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40506253},
          volume = {124},
          year = {2009},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40506253}
        }
        
    • Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. & Zingales, L., 2006. Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2), pp.23–48. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        Until recently, economists have been reluctant to rely on culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena. Much of this reluctance stems from the very notion of culture: it is so broad and the channels through which it can enter the economic discourse so ubiquitous (and vague) that it is difficult to design testable, refutable hypotheses. In recent years, however, better techniques and more data have made it possible to identify systematic differences in people’s preferences and beliefs and to relate them to various measures of cultural legacy. These developments suggest an approach to introducing culturally-based explanations into economics that can be tested and may substantially enrich our understanding of economic phenomena. This paper summarizes this approach and its achievements so far, and outlines directions for future research.

      • BibTeX
        @article{gsz2006,
          author = {Guiso, Luigi and Sapienza, Paola and Zingales, Luigi},
          date-added = {2015-05-27 16:54:03 +0000},
          date-modified = {2016-03-06 16:41:33 +0000},
          journal = {Journal of Economic Perspectives},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = {Spring},
          number = {2},
          pages = {23-48},
          title = {{Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?}},
          url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v20y2006i2p23-48.html},
          volume = {20},
          year = {2006},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v20y2006i2p23-48.html}
        }
        
    • Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. & Zingales, L., 2004. The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development. The American Economic Review, 94(3), pp.pp. 526–556. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        To identify the effect of social capital on financial development, we exploit social capital differences within Italy. In high-social-capital areas, households are more likely to use checks, invest less in cash and more in stock, have higher access to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit. The effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people. These results are not driven by omitted environmental variables, since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born.

      • BibTeX
        @article{gsz2004,
          author = {Guiso, Luigi and Sapienza, Paola and Zingales, Luigi},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2004 American Economic Association},
          date-modified = {2016-03-06 16:41:50 +0000},
          issn = {00028282},
          journal = {The American Economic Review},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {Jun., 2004},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          number = {3},
          pages = {pp. 526-556},
          publisher = {American Economic Association},
          title = {The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592941},
          volume = {94},
          year = {2004},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3592941}
        }
        
    • Hornbeck, R., 2010. Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(2), pp.767–810. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        This paper examines the impact on agricultural development of the introduction of barbed wire fencing to the American Plains in the late nineteenth century. Without a fence, farmers risked uncompensated damage by others’ livestock. From 1880 to 1900, the introduction and near-universal adoption of barbed wire greatly reduced the cost of fences, relative to the predominant wooden fences, especially in counties with the least woodland. Over that period, counties with the least woodland experienced substantial relative increases in settlement, land improvement, land values, and the productivity and production share of crops most in need of protection. This increase in agricultural development appears partly to reflect farmers’ increased ability to protect their land from encroachment. States’ inability to protect this full bundle of property rights on the frontier, beyond providing formal land titles, might have otherwise restricted agricultural development. (c) 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..

      • BibTeX
        @article{hornbeck2010,
          author = {Hornbeck, Richard},
          date-added = {2015-05-27 16:39:58 +0000},
          date-modified = {2015-05-27 16:40:12 +0000},
          journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = may,
          number = {2},
          pages = {767-810},
          title = {{Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development}},
          url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v125y2010i2p767-810.html},
          volume = {125},
          year = {2010},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/qjecon/v125y2010i2p767-810.html}
        }
        
    • Hoyland, B., Moene, K. & Willumsen, F., 2012. The Tyranny of International Index Rankings. Journal of Development Economics, 97, pp.1–14.
      • Abstract

        International index rankings are popular, but perhaps too persuasive. They emphasize country differences where similarity is the dominant feature. Rankings based on Doing Business, the Human Development Index and Freedom House can be misleading, not because of wrong indicators, but because the estimation of the scores ignores inherent uncertainty. Re-estimated with a method that captures this uncertainty, it becomes clear that ranking every adjacent country is a rather courageous activity.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Hoyland:2012oq,
          author = {Hoyland, Bjorn and Moene, Karl and Willumsen, Fredrik},
          date-added = {2012-12-19 19:44:03 +0000},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:31:55 +0000},
          journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          pages = {1-14},
          title = {The Tyranny of International Index Rankings},
          volume = {97},
          year = {2012}
        }
        
    • Iyer, L., 2010. Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term Consequences. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4), pp.pp. 693–713. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        This paper compares economic outcomes across areas in India that were under direct British colonial rule with areas that were under indirect colonial rule. Controlling for selective annexation using a specific policy rule, I find that areas that experienced direct rule have significantly lower levels of access to schools, health centers, and roads in the postcolonial period. I find evidence that the quality of governance in the colonial period has a significant and persistent effect on postcolonial outcomes.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Iyer2010,
          author = {Iyer, Lakshmi},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2010 The MIT Press},
          date-modified = {2012-12-19 21:14:08 +0000},
          issn = {00346535},
          journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {NOVEMBER 2010},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          number = {4},
          pages = {pp. 693-713},
          publisher = {The MIT Press},
          title = {Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term Consequences},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40985788},
          volume = {92},
          year = {2010},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/40985788}
        }
        
    • Johnson, S., McMillan, J. & Woodruff, C., 2002. Property Rights and Finance. The American Economic Review, 92(5), pp.pp. 1335–1356. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        Which is the tighter constraint on private sector investment: weak property rights or limited access to external finance? From a survey of new firms in post-communist countries, we find that weak property rights discourage firms from reinvesting their profits, even when bank loans are available. Where property rights are relatively strong, firms reinvest their profits; where they are relatively weak, entrepreneurs do not want to invest from retained earnings.

      • BibTeX
        @article{jmw2002,
          author = {Johnson, Simon and McMillan, John and Woodruff, Christopher},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2002 American Economic Association},
          date-modified = {2016-03-06 16:41:58 +0000},
          issn = {00028282},
          journal = {The American Economic Review},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {Dec., 2002},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          number = {5},
          pages = {pp. 1335-1356},
          publisher = {American Economic Association},
          title = {Property Rights and Finance},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083253},
          volume = {92},
          year = {2002},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/3083253}
        }
        
    • Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. & Mastruzzi, M., 2010. Worldwide Governance Indicators.
      • BibTeX
        @misc{Kaufmann:2012uq,
          author = {Kaufmann, Daniel and Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo},
          date-added = {2012-04-13 16:39:02 +0000},
          date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:09:06 +0000},
          howpublished = {http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp},
          keywords = {intro,inst},
          title = {Worldwide Governance Indicators},
          year = {2010}
        }
        
    • Knack, S. & Keefer, P., 1995. Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and Politics, 7(3), pp.207–227.
      • Abstract

        The impact of property rights on economic growth is examined using indicators provided by country risk evaluators to potential foreign investors. Indicators include evaluations of contract enforceability and risk of expropriation. Using these variables, property rights are found to have a greater impact on investment and growth than has previously been found for proxies such as the Gastil indices of liberties, and frequencies of revolutions, coups and political assassinations. Rates of convergence to U.S.-level incomes increase notably when these property rights variables are included in growth regressions. These results are robust to the inclusion of measures of factor accumulation and of economic policy.

      • BibTeX
        @article{kk1995,
          author = {Knack, Stephen and Keefer, Philip},
          date-modified = {2015-03-16 21:42:51 +0000},
          journal = {Economics and Politics},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = nov,
          number = {3},
          pages = {207-227},
          title = {Institutions And Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures},
          volume = {7},
          year = {1995}
        }
        
    • La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A., 2008. The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins. Journal of Economic Literature, 46(2), pp.pp. 285–332. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country’s laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.

      • BibTeX
        @article{lls2008,
          author = {La Porta, Rafael and Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2008 American Economic Association},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:32:06 +0000},
          issn = {00220515},
          journal = {Journal of Economic Literature},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {Jun., 2008},
          keywords = {inst},
          number = {2},
          pages = {pp. 285-332},
          publisher = {American Economic Association},
          title = {The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27646991},
          volume = {46},
          year = {2008},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/27646991}
        }
        
    • La Porta, R. et al., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), pp.pp. 1113–1155. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil-law countries the weakest legal protections of investors, with German and Scandanavian civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified share-holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

      • BibTeX
        @article{llsv1998,
          author = {La Porta, Rafael and Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W.},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 1998 The University of Chicago Press},
          date-modified = {2016-03-06 16:42:14 +0000},
          issn = {00223808},
          journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {December 1998},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          number = {6},
          pages = {pp. 1113-1155},
          publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
          title = {Law and Finance},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/250042},
          volume = {106},
          year = {1998},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/250042}
        }
        
    • Mauro, P., 1995. Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), pp.681–712.
      • Abstract

        This paper analyzes a newly assembled data set consisting of subjective indices of corruption, the amount of red tape, the efficiency of the judicial system, and various categories of political stability for a cross section of countries. Corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth. The results are robust to controlling for endogeneity by using an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument.

      • BibTeX
        @article{mauro1995,
          author = {Mauro, Paolo},
          date-modified = {2015-03-16 21:47:26 +0000},
          journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = aug,
          number = {3},
          pages = {681-712},
          title = {Corruption and Growth},
          volume = {110},
          year = {1995}
        }
        
    • McArthur, J.W. & Sachs, J.D., 2001. Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000).
      • Abstract

        This paper responds to findings by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000) that suggest weak institutions, but not physical geography and correlates like disease burden, explain current variation in levels of economic development across former colonies. Using similar data and expanding the sample of countries analyzed, our regression analysis shows that both institutions and geographically-related variables such as malaria incidence or life expectancy at birth are strongly lnked to gross national product per capita. We argue that the evidence presented in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson is likely limited by the inherently small sample of ex-colonies and the limited geographic dispersion of those countries.

      • BibTeX
        @unpublished{McArthur:2001tg,
          author = {McArthur, John W. and Sachs, Jeffrey D.},
          date-added = {2012-12-19 19:46:46 +0000},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:32:14 +0000},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = feb,
          note = {NBER Working Paper 8114},
          title = {Institutions and Geography: Comment on Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000)},
          year = {2001}
        }
        
    • Michalopoulos, S. & Papaioannou, E., 2014. National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1), pp.151–213.
      • Abstract

        We investigate the role of national institutions on African regional development in a novel framework. We exploit the fact that the arbitrary political boundaries in the eve of African independence partitioned more than two hundred ethnic groups across different countries subjecting similar cultures, residing in homogeneous geographic areas, to different formal institutions. Using both a matching-type and a regression discontinuity approach we show that differences in countrywide institutional structures across the national border do not explain within-ethnicity differences in economic performance, as captured by satellite light density at night. Despite some evidence of heterogeneity, for the overwhelming majority of groups the relationship is economically and statistically insignificant. While our results do not necessarily generalize to areas far from the national borders, close to the capital cities or to other parts of the world, they suggest that the cross-country positive correlation between formal national institutions and economic development has to be carefully interpreted.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Michalopoulos:2012mi,
          author = {Michalopoulos, Stelios and Papaioannou, Elias},
          date-added = {2012-12-19 20:29:15 +0000},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:30:21 +0000},
          journal = {Quarterly Journal of Economics},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          number = {1},
          pages = {151-213},
          title = {National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa},
          volume = {129},
          year = {2014}
        }
        
    • Michalopoulos, S. & Papaioannou, E., 2013. Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development. Econometrica, 81(1), pp.113–152.
      • Abstract

        We investigate the role of deeply-rooted pre-colonial ethnic institutions in shaping com- parative regional development within African countries. We combine information on the spatial distribution of ethnicities before colonization with regional variation in contempo- rary economic performance, as proxied by satellite images of light density at night. We document a strong association between pre-colonial ethnic political centralization and re- gional development. This pattern is not driven by differences in local geographic features or by other observable ethnic-specific cultural and economic variables. The strong positive association between pre-colonial political complexity and contemporary development ob- tains also within pairs of adjacent ethnic homelands with different legacies of pre-colonial political institutions.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Michalopoulos:2012qa,
          author = {Michalopoulos, Stelios and Papaioannou, Elias},
          date-added = {2012-12-19 20:24:36 +0000},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:29:35 +0000},
          journal = {Econometrica},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          number = {1},
          pages = {113-152},
          title = {Pre-colonial Ethnic Institutions and Contemporary African Development},
          volume = {81},
          year = {2013}
        }
        
    • Michalopoulos, S. & Papaioannou, E., 2011. The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        We examine the long-run consequences of the scramble for Africa among European powers in the late 19th century and uncover the following empirical regularities. First, using information on the spatial distribution of African ethnicities before colonization, we show that borders were arbitrarily drawn. Apart from the land mass and water area of an ethnicity’s historical homeland, no other geographic, ecological, historical, and ethnic-specific traits predict which ethnic groups have been partitioned by the national border. Second, using data on the location of civil conflicts after independence, we show that partitioned ethnic groups have suffered significantly more warfare; moreover, partitioned ethnicities have experienced more prolonged and more devastating civil wars. Third, we identify sizeable spillovers; civil conflict spreads from the homeland of partitioned ethnicities to nearby ethnic regions. These results are robust to a rich set of controls at a fine level and the inclusion of country fixed effects and ethnic-family fixed effects. The uncovered evidence thus identifies a sizable causal impact of the scramble for Africa on warfare.

      • BibTeX
        @techreport{mp2011,
          author = {Michalopoulos, Stelios and Papaioannou, Elias},
          date-added = {2015-05-27 16:45:53 +0000},
          date-modified = {2015-05-27 16:46:06 +0000},
          institution = {C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = nov,
          number = {8676},
          title = {{The Long-Run Effects of the Scramble for Africa}},
          type = {CEPR Discussion Papers},
          url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/8676.html},
          year = {2011},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/8676.html}
        }
        
    • Naritomi, J., Soares, R. & Assuncao, J.J., 2012. Institutional Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil. Journal of Economic History, 72(2), pp.393–422.
      • Abstract

        This article analyzes the determinants of local institutions in Brazil. We show that institutional quality and distribution of land are partly inherited from the colonial histories experienced by different areas of the country. The sugar cane boom—characterized by an oligarchic society—is associated with more land inequality. The gold boom—characterized by a heavily inefficient presence of the Portuguese state—is associated with worse governance and access to justice. We do not find similar effects for a postcolonial boom (coffee). We also find that the colonial episodes are correlated with lower provision of public goods.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Naritomi:2012ij,
          author = {Naritomi, Joana and Soares, Rodrigo and Assuncao, Juliano J.},
          date-added = {2012-12-19 19:52:09 +0000},
          date-modified = {2013-04-21 15:00:13 +0000},
          journal = {Journal of Economic History},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          month = jun,
          number = {2},
          pages = {393-422},
          title = {Institutional Development and Colonial Heritage within Brazil},
          volume = {72},
          year = {2012}
        }
        
    • Nunn, N., 2009. The Importance of History for Economic Development. Annual Review of Economics, 1, pp.65–92.
      • Abstract

        This article provides a survey of a growing body of empirical evidence that points toward the important long-term effects that historic events can have on economic development. The most re- cent studies, using microlevel data and more sophisticated identifi- cation techniques, have moved beyond testing whether history matters and attempt to identify exactly why history matters. The most commonly examined channels include institutions, culture, knowledge and technology, and movements between multiple equi- libria. The article concludes with a discussion of the questions that remain and the direction of current research in the literature.

      • BibTeX
        @article{nunn_2009,
          author = {Nunn, Nathan},
          date-added = {2011-05-15 17:28:01 -0500},
          date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:14:40 +0000},
          journal = {Annual Review of Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          pages = {65-92},
          title = {The Importance of History for Economic Development},
          volume = {1},
          year = {2009},
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        }
        
    • Nunn, N., 2008. The Long-Term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1), pp.139–176. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        Can part of Africa’s current underdevelopment be explained by its slave trades? To explore this question, I use data from shipping records and historical documents reporting slave ethnicities to construct estimates of the number of slaves exported from each country during Africa’s slave trades. I find a robust negative relationship between the number of slaves exported from a country and current economic performance. To better understand if the relationship is causal, I examine the historical evidence on selection into the slave trades and use instrumental variables. Together the evidence suggests that the slave trades had an adverse effect on economic development.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Nunn2008,
          author = {Nunn, Nathan},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2008 Oxford University Press},
          date-modified = {2017-01-16 21:59:37 +0000},
          issn = {00335533},
          journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {Feb., 2008},
          keywords = {intro,ec7350,inst},
          number = {1},
          pages = {139-176},
          publisher = {Oxford University Press},
          title = {The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098896},
          volume = {123},
          year = {2008},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098896}
        }
        
    • Nunn, N. & Puga, D., 2012. Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(1), pp.pp. 20–36. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        We show that geography, through its impact on history, can have important effects on economic development today. The analysis focuses on the historic interaction between ruggedness and Africa’s slave trades. Although rugged terrain hinders trade and most productive activities, negatively affecting income globally, rugged terrain within Africa afforded protection to those being raided during the slave trades. Since the slave trades retarded subsequent economic development, ruggedness within Africa has also had a historic indirect positive effect on income. Studying all countries worldwide, we estimate the differential effect of ruggedness on income for Africa. We show that the differential effect of ruggedness is statistically significant and economically meaningful, it is found in Africa only, it cannot be explained by other factors like Africa’s unique geographic environment, and it is fully accounted for by the history of the slave trades.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Nunn2012,
          author = {Nunn, Nathan and Puga, Diego},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2012 The MIT Press},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:32:29 +0000},
          issn = {00346535},
          journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {February 2012},
          keywords = {inst},
          number = {1},
          pages = {pp. 20-36},
          publisher = {The MIT Press},
          title = {Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/41349158},
          volume = {94},
          year = {2012},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/41349158}
        }
        
    • Nunn, N. & Wantchekon, L., 2011. The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa. American Economic Review, 101(7), pp.3221–52.
      • Abstract

        We show that current differences in trust levels within Africa can be traced back to the transatlantic and Indian Ocean slave trades. Combining contemporary individual-level survey data with historical data on slave shipments by ethnic group, we find that individuals whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade are less trusting today. Evidence from a variety of identification strategies suggests that the relationship is causal. Examining causal mechanisms, we show that most of the impact of the slave trade is through factors that are internal to the individual, such as cultural norms, beliefs, and values.

      • BibTeX
        @article{Nunn:2011uq,
          author = {Nunn, Nathan and Wantchekon, Leonard},
          date-added = {2012-12-19 17:08:03 +0000},
          date-modified = {2013-04-21 15:00:13 +0000},
          journal = {American Economic Review},
          keywords = {ec7350,inst},
          month = dec,
          number = {7},
          pages = {3221-52},
          title = {The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa},
          volume = {101},
          year = {2011}
        }
        
    • Olson, M., 1996. Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(2), pp.3–24. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        Some research presumes that, when rational parties bargain, nothing is left on the table, so that social outcomes are efficient and leave countries on the frontiers of their aggregate production functions. A study of differences in per capita incomes across countries shows that this cannot be the case. Countries’ endowments of natural and human resources do not explain any significant part of the variation in incomes and the mobility of capital assures that it is impartially available to all countries. National differences in the quality of policies and institutions across countries mainly account for differences in per capita incomes.

      • BibTeX
        @article{olson1996,
          author = {Olson, Mancur},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 1996 American Economic Association},
          date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:10:47 +0000},
          issn = {08953309},
          journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {Spring, 1996},
          keywords = {intro,inst},
          number = {2},
          pages = {3-24},
          publisher = {American Economic Association},
          title = {Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations are Rich, and Others Poor},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138479},
          volume = {10},
          year = {1996},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138479}
        }
        
    • Ramcharan, R., 2010. Inequality and Redistribution: Evidence from US Counties and States, 1890-1930. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4), pp.729–744.
      • Abstract

        Does economic inequality affect redistributive policy? This paper turns to U.S. county data on land inequality over the period 1890 to 1930 to help address this fundamental question in political economy. Redistributive policy was primarily decided at the local level during this period, making county-level data particularly informative. Examining within-state variation also reduces the potential impact of latent institutional and political variables. The paper also uses a variety of identification strategies, including historic variables as well as county weather and crop characteristics, as instruments for land inequality. The evidence consistently suggests that greater inequality is significantly associated with less redistribution. This negative relationship is especially large in heavily rural counties, where concentrated landownership implied that landed elites also controlled the majority of economic production.

      • BibTeX
        @article{ramcharan2010inequality,
          author = {Ramcharan, Rodney},
          date-added = {2011-05-24 19:46:20 -0500},
          date-modified = {2015-03-16 21:51:33 +0000},
          journal = {The Review of Economics and Statistics},
          keywords = {inst},
          number = {4},
          pages = {729--744},
          publisher = {MIT Press},
          title = {Inequality and Redistribution: Evidence from US Counties and States, 1890-1930},
          volume = {92},
          year = {2010}
        }
        
    • Rauch, F. & Michaels, G., 2013. Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        Do locational fundamentals such as coastlines and rivers determine town locations, or can historical events trap towns in unfavorable locations for centuries? We examine the effects on town locations of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, which temporarily ended urbanization in Britain, but not in France. As urbanization recovered, medieval towns were more often found in Roman era town locations in France than in Britain, and this difference still persists today. The resetting of Britain’s urban network gave it better access to naturally navigable waterways when this was important, while many French towns remained without such access.

      • BibTeX
        @techreport{rm2013,
          author = {Rauch, Ferdinand and Michaels, Guy},
          date-added = {2015-05-26 19:30:04 +0000},
          date-modified = {2015-05-26 19:30:19 +0000},
          institution = {University of Oxford, Department of Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = nov,
          number = {684},
          title = {{Resetting the Urban Network: 117-2012}},
          type = {Economics Series Working Papers},
          url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/wpaper/684.html},
          year = {2013},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/oxf/wpaper/684.html}
        }
        
    • Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R. & Verdier, T., 2006. Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. Journal of Development Economics, 79(2), pp.447–468. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        I modify the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders. This allows me to provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion. Moreover, many of the so-called "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear.

      • BibTeX
        @article{rtv06,
          author = {Robinson, James A. and Torvik, Ragnar and Verdier, Thierry},
          date-added = {2015-03-16 21:13:58 +0000},
          date-modified = {2015-03-16 21:46:08 +0000},
          journal = {Journal of Development Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = apr,
          number = {2},
          pages = {447-468},
          title = {Political Foundations of the Resource Curse},
          url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v79y2006i2p447-468.html},
          volume = {79},
          year = {2006},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/deveco/v79y2006i2p447-468.html}
        }
        
    • Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. & Trebbi, F., 2004. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9(2), pp.131–165. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        We estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world, using recently developed instrumental variables for institutions and trade. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions “trumps” everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, conventional measures of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the “wrong” (i.e., negative) sign. We relate our results to recent literature, and where differences exist, trace their origins to choices on samples, specification, and instrumentation.

      • BibTeX
        @article{rst2004,
          author = {Rodrik, Dani and Subramanian, Arvind and Trebbi, Francesco},
          date-modified = {2014-07-18 16:32:52 +0000},
          issn = {1381-4338},
          issue = {2},
          journal = {Journal of Economic Growth},
          keyword = {Business and Economics},
          keywords = {inst},
          pages = {131-165},
          publisher = {Springer Netherlands},
          title = {Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development},
          url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:JOEG.0000031425.72248.85},
          volume = {9},
          year = {2004},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:JOEG.0000031425.72248.85}
        }
        
    • Sokoloff, K.L. & Engerman, S.L., 2000. History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp.217–232. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        The explanations offered for the contrasting records of long-run growth and development among the societies of North and South America most often focus on institutions. The traditional explanations for the sources of these differences in institutions, typically highlight the significance of national heritage or religion. We, in contrast, argue that a hemispheric perspective across the wide range of colonies established in the New World by the Europeans suggests that although there were many influences, factor endowments or initial conditions had profound and enduring effects on the long-run paths of institutional and economic development followed by the respective economies.

      • BibTeX
        @article{es2000,
          author = {Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Engerman, Stanley L.},
          copyright = {Copyright {\copyright} 2000 American Economic Association},
          date-modified = {2015-03-17 13:11:52 +0000},
          issn = {08953309},
          journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
          jstor_articletype = {research-article},
          jstor_formatteddate = {Summer, 2000},
          keywords = {intro,ec7350,inst,divergence},
          number = {3},
          pages = {217-232},
          publisher = {American Economic Association},
          title = {History Lessons: Institutions, Factors Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World},
          url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646928},
          volume = {14},
          year = {2000},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2646928}
        }
        
    • Vollrath, D., 2013. Inequality and school funding in the rural United States, 1890. Explorations in Economic History, 50(2), pp.267–284.   Paper   Data
      • Abstract

        This paper examines the relationship of inequality to school funding in counties of the U.S. in 1890. Inequality, measured here on the basis of farm-size distributions, is found to be negatively related to local school property tax revenues across the whole sample of 1345 rural counties. However, further analysis shows that this relationship is not consistent across the sample. In the North, there is a significant negative relationship between inequality and school funding, and this relationship is shown to be consistent with the fact that assessed values of property did not rise linearly with wealth. Across the South, there is no distinct relationship between inequality and school funding. The results also indicate that inequality in the South cannot directly explain the gap in school funding with the North, in the sense that redistributing farms in the South to match the Northern distributions leads to no predicted increase in school funding.

      • BibTeX
        @article{dvschool2013,
          author = {Vollrath, Dietrich},
          data = {tax_final.zip},
          date-added = {2014-02-14 19:33:13 +0000},
          date-modified = {2016-03-06 23:41:38 +0000},
          journal = {Explorations in Economic History},
          keywords = {inst,ineq,me},
          number = {2},
          pages = {267-284},
          paper = {tax_published.pdf},
          title = {Inequality and school funding in the rural United States, 1890},
          volume = {50},
          year = {2013},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/exehis/v50y2013i2p267-284.html}
        }
        
    • Wen, Y. & Luo, J., 2015. Institutions Do Not Rule: Reassessing the Driving Forces of Economic Development, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Available at: Link.
      • Abstract

        We use cross-country data and instrumental variables widely used in the literature to show that (i) institutions (such as property rights and the rule of law) do not explain industrialization and (ii) agrarian countries and industrial countries have entirely different determinants for income levels. In particular, geography, rather than institutions, explains the income differences among agrarian countries, while institutions appear to matter only for income variations in industrial economies. Moreover, we find it is the stage of economic development (or the absence/presence of industrialization) that explains a country’s quality of institutions rather than vice versa. The finding that institutions do not explain industrialization but are instead explained by industrialization lends support to the well-received view among prominent economic historians—that institutional changes in 17th and 18th century England did not cause the Industrial Revolution.

      • BibTeX
        @techreport{wl15,
          author = {Wen, Yi and Luo, Jinfeng},
          date-added = {2015-03-16 20:32:33 +0000},
          date-modified = {2015-03-16 20:32:50 +0000},
          institution = {Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis},
          keywords = {inst},
          month = jan,
          number = {2015-1},
          title = {{Institutions Do Not Rule: Reassessing the Driving Forces of Economic Development}},
          type = {Working Papers},
          url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedlwp/2015-001.html},
          year = {2015},
          bdsk-url-1 = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedlwp/2015-001.html}
        }