

# Social infrastructure and long-run growth

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Introduction to Economic Growth

# Rich and poor

Social infrastructure

An investment problem

Raw indicators

Choosing  
underdevelopment

We have several reasons why countries could be rich or poor:

- ▶ Physical capital formation ( $s_I$ )
- ▶ Human capital ( $h$ ), skills and diffusion
- ▶ R&D ( $s_R$ )
- ▶ Population growth ( $g_L$ ), both negative and positive
- ▶ Trade and diffusion of innovations
- ▶ Mis-allocations of factors

Could conceive of each in terms of making a choice on how to use resources:

- ▶ Physical capital: use  $L$ ,  $K$  to build more capital
- ▶ Human capital: use  $L$ ,  $K$  to educate workers
- ▶ R&D: use  $L$ ,  $K$  to innovate
- ▶ Population growth: use  $L$ ,  $K$  to create more people
- ▶ Trade/diffusion: use  $L$ ,  $K$  to make trade or adoption possible
- ▶ Misallocation: use  $L$ ,  $K$  in better/worse ways

A general decision process would be to evaluate the costs ( $F$ ) against benefits ( $V$ ). Think of costs  $F$ :

- ▶ Lost consumption while investing in capital goods
- ▶ Time spent in school
- ▶ Time spent by researchers/innovators
- ▶ Time spent raising a family and not working (or working in amenable positions)
- ▶ Capital and labor spent building physical and legal structure to import/adopt
- ▶ Lost output of good  $i$  if you push factors to good  $j$

Think of benefits  $V$ :

- ▶ Continued use of the capital good over time
- ▶ Application of skills learned over time
- ▶ Innovation that can be used over time (and shared)
- ▶ More people available to work/innovate/invest over time
- ▶ New varieties available over time
- ▶ Higher overall output

# Now and later

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A lot of the comparison of  $F$  and  $V$  comes down to

- ▶ Incurring a cost,  $F$ , now
- ▶ For benefits,  $V$ , that accrue in the future

In the end you make the investment/innovate/educate/reform if  
 $V > F$

# Higher $F$

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If you make  $F$  higher, you make fewer investments worthwhile:

- ▶ Bribes, corruption
- ▶ Procedures/regulations
- ▶ Crime/safety

Note that you might *want* to slow down some investments (e.g. narcotic production) via these routes.

# Higher $V$

The value of a project/investment is something like

$$V_t = \frac{\pi_t}{r - g_\pi + \rho},$$

where  $\pi_t$  is the initial profits you can make,  $r$  is discount on the future, and  $g_\pi$  is how fast profits grow.  $\rho$  is a chance you lose rights to that project for whatever reason.

- ▶ If policies (market structure, taxes) lower  $\pi_t$ , less value
- ▶ If property rights over project are insecure,  $\rho$  is high, less value
- ▶ If *others* don't value future,  $r$  is high, less value
- ▶ If *others* don't invest,  $g_\pi$  is low, less value

Lump a lot of this together as “social infrastructure” and whether it supports high  $V$  and low  $F$



No clear way to measure this. World Bank collects measures of things like:

- ▶ Accountability of political leaders
- ▶ Political stability
- ▶ Government effectiveness
- ▶ Regulatory quality
- ▶ Rule of law
- ▶ Control of corruption

These are often measured via survey of perceptions. We take average of these six to measure “social infrastructure”


# Physical capital

Social infrastructure


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


## Raw indicators



## Social infrastructure

Raw indicators



We don't know if this is causal

- ▶ Higher capital accumulation could lead to higher GDP per capita, which allows places to invest in social infrastructure: maybe this goes the other way
- ▶ Individual studies point towards social infrastructure determining these outcomes
- ▶ Specific historical instances (e.g. North/South Korea) are examples where differences in social infrastructure seem to determine level of GDP per capita

# Why not fix this?

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Things that raise  $F$  and lower  $V$  are subject to change. Why don't poor countries

- ▶ Lower regulatory burdens
- ▶ Eliminate corruption
- ▶ Assure property rights
- ▶ Support more education
- ▶ Create more effective governments

The benefit is that this would raise GDP. What's stopping them?

# Someone benefits

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Each individual case is unique. General story is something like

- ▶ *Someone* benefits from current structure (e.g. a bribe-taker)
- ▶ Improving social infrastructure involves those people losing
- ▶ You could promise to give losers a slice of the increased GDP
- ▶ But those promises may not be credible
- ▶ So no one can or will make that deal